我是中国民主党联总总部海外创始人，兼联总常任主席王希哲 

一、驳所谓“朱虞夫，原為中國民主黨大陸地區浙江籌委會之成員，然不具海外之中國民主黨全國聯合總部成員資格，無選舉權、任職權及其他黨內權利”。 你们胡说！ 1998年，国内中国民主党创党第一批和第二批领袖（包括朱虞夫先生）纷纷入狱后，为应对危难局面，中国民主党北京党部牵头，成立了中国民主党联合总部，推举了徐文立、王有才、秦永敏、王希哲为“常任主席”。因徐文立、王有才、秦永敏三人在狱中，只能王希哲一人，近十年担负起了中国民主党联总常任主席的担子。那时，不但北京党部领导人何德普，包括浙江筹委会领导人陈树庆、聂敏之等在内的国内外全部民主党组织，都在王希哲的领导之下。因此王希哲承认和宣告，国内全部的中国民主党成员，都是中国民主党联总成员。 九年后的2009年，王军涛联络王有才纽约另立山头，组织了“中国民主党全委会”。但这是中国民主党海外的派别分歧，与国内的民主党成员无关，国内民主党成员不存在来到海外“站队”问题。因此，只要国内早期的中国民主党身份可稽的党员，特别是中国民主党经狱中岁月磨练的创党领袖党员，如王有才、朱虞夫等，根据王希哲的宣告，是当然的中国民主党联总党员和中国民主党全委会党员。绝不存在界力建黎小龙等荒唐所谓的“朱虞夫，原為中國民主黨大陸地區浙江籌委會之成員，然不具海外之中國民主黨全國聯合總部成員資格，無選舉權、任職權及其他黨內權利”,这样昏天黑地的胡说八道！甚至可以反过来，不是你界力建们有权否认朱虞夫等创党领袖的联总或全委会身份，恰相反，是朱虞夫等创党领袖有权否认你们的伪“中国民主党党员”身份！ 拿黎小龙来说，你曾是国内广西的党员。但广西党部并未正式加入过联总。你凭什么可以是中国民主党联总党员？你的身份怎么确认？你拿什么证据证明？你经过常任主席王希哲批准吗？这些都没有，你根据什么可以自称你就“具有中国民主党联总成員資格”，具有中国民主党联总的“選舉權、任職權及其他黨內權利”？难道不正是因为当年得常任主席王希哲承认国内一切身份可稽的中国民主党党员都当然具有联总的身份，你才没有办过原始的加入联总的组织手续吗？要知道，联总海外的初始党员，都曾在王希哲领誓下，在孙中山像前举手宣誓入党的！同样，兰伟、覃夕权等，你们有过这样正式的入党入联总手续吗？没有！你们有什么资格有什么脸皮否认中国民主党久经监狱磨练的主要创党人朱虞夫先生的联总身份资格？界力建这下三流就更不必去说他了！ 

二、质问界力建、兰伟、覃夕权、黎小龙等，你们是根据党章哪条规定，可以有权“停止（五大当选主席)鄭存柱之職務”和委任所谓“代理主席”？ 界力建、兰伟、覃夕权、黎小龙等，你们口口声声说五大当选主席郑存柱“辞职”。你们把他的辞职书拿出来过吗？请问他的辞职书在哪里？为什么郑存柱主席反复要你们把他的“辞职书”拿出来给选举他的全党党员看看，你们始终拿不出来呢？你们拿不出来，你们却一再硬要造谣，把你们一千遍的造谣当事实，这是为什么呢？ 好，退一大步，就算郑存柱有提出“辞职”，请问党章的哪一条规定党的代表大会选出的主席提出了辞职，你们几人可以背着主席开黑会，以所谓“总部委员会”就有权私自“决议”“停止（五大当选主席）鄭存柱之職務”呢？你们煞有介事说你们是依据党章。请你们把党章给了你们这样权利的规定拿出来给我们看看好吗？不然，你们就是最卑鄙的政变！ 全党代表大会选出的主席，只有全党的代表大会有权讨论接受或慰留主席的辞职。没有任何机构可以僭越代表大会行使这项权利。特殊情况下，党的主席可以召开党的特别代表大会讨论暂行决议，但它的任何决议，仍需经下一届全党代表大会追认。何况现在，全党代表大会选出的郑存柱主席一再声明他从无要求辞职一事。 再退步，哪怕郑确曾提出辞职，但尚未经党的代表大会决议接受其辞职期间，他就收回了辞职请求，他就仍是全党合法主席，没有党的任何职能机构可以蛮横认为他不能收回。可以私自“决议”，将全党的代表大会选出的主席“停职”和擅自另委任“代理主席”。 故此，界力建、兰伟、覃夕权、黎小龙等人的所为，完全是一场阴谋而卑鄙的对党政变。 

三、界力建违法私自另行注册伪“中国民主党联总”，应受法律追诉。且其行为已属于自行脱离原中国民主党联总组织。而兰伟、覃夕权、黎小龙等人明知错误，却顽固助纣为虐，合伙政变，应督其作出深刻反省和检讨作最后拯救。不然，应将其悉数开除出中国民主党联总组织。 

中国民主党联总总部海外创始人兼联总前常任主席王希哲 2025年2月16日

A Despicable Coup – A Rebuttal to Jie Lijian, Lan Wei, Qin Xiquan, Li Xiaolong, and Others

I am Wang Xizhe, the overseas founder and former Permanent Chairman of the General Headquarters of China Democracy Party.

1. Refuting the Absurd Claim Regarding Zhu Yufu’s Party Membership

The statement that “Zhu Yufu was a member of the Zhejiang Preparatory Committee of China Democracy Party in mainland China, but does not qualify as a member of the General Headquarters of China Democracy Party overseas, and therefore has no voting rights, appointment rights, or other internal party privileges” is sheer nonsense!

In 1998, when the first and second batch of founding leaders of China Democracy Party in China, including Zhu Yufu, were imprisoned, the Beijing Party Branch of China Democracy Party took the lead in forming the General Headquarters of China Democracy Party (联总, Lianzong) to respond to the crisis. At that time, Xu Wenli, Wang Youcai, Qin Yongmin, and I (Wang Xizhe) were elected as “Permanent Chairmen”. However, since Xu Wenli, Wang Youcai, and Qin Yongmin were all imprisoned, I alone carried the responsibility of Permanent Chairman for nearly ten years.

During that time, not only the leadership of the Beijing Party Branch, including He Depu, but also the leadership of the Zhejiang Preparatory Committee, including Chen Shuqing and Nie Minzhi, as well as all domestic and overseas China Democracy Party organisations, were under my leadership. Therefore, I recognised and declared that all members of China Democracy Party in mainland China were also members of the General Headquarters of China Democracy Party.

Nine years later, in 2009, Wang Juntao contacted Wang Youcai in New York to establish a separate faction—the “National Committee of China Democracy Party” (全委会, Quanweihui). However, this was merely an overseas factional split and had nothing to do with China Democracy Party members in China. There was never a question of domestic members needing to “pick sides” among overseas factions.

Thus, all early members of China Democracy Party in China, especially those founding leaders who endured years of imprisonment, such as Wang Youcai and Zhu Yufu, are automatically members of both the General Headquarters (联总) and the National Committee (全委会).

Jie Lijian and Li Xiaolong’s claim that “Zhu Yufu does not qualify as a member of the General Headquarters of China Democracy Party and has no voting rights or appointment rights” is utterly absurd! In fact, the opposite is true—it is Zhu Yufu and other founding leaders who have the authority to question the legitimacy of so-called ‘China Democracy Party members’ like you!

Take Li Xiaolong, for example. You were once a party member in Guangxi, but the Guangxi Party Branch never formally joined the General Headquarters (联总). So, on what basis do you claim to be a member of the General Headquarters? What is your proof of membership? Did you ever receive approval from the Permanent Chairman, Wang Xizhe?

You have none of these, yet you claim you have the “right” to be a member of the General Headquarters and to exercise voting and appointment rights. The only reason you were ever considered a member was because I declared that all early, verifiable members of China Democracy Party in China were automatically part of the General Headquarters.

Unlike the early overseas members of the General Headquarters, who all took an oath under my leadership before a portrait of Sun Yat-sen, you and others—such as Lan Wei and Qin Xiquan—never underwent any formal induction or swearing-in ceremony.

So, on what grounds do you deny the rightful membership of Zhu Yufu, a founding leader who endured years of imprisonment for the cause? As for Jie Lijian, there is even less to be said about his baseless claims.

2. Questioning the Legitimacy of the So-Called “Suspension” of Zheng Cunzhu

Jie Lijian, Lan Wei, Qin Xiquan, and Li Xiaolong—on what grounds, according to which article of the party charter, do you claim the authority to “suspend the duly elected Fifth Congress Chairman, Zheng Cunzhu”, and appoint a so-called “acting chairman”?

You claim that Zheng Cunzhu resigned. Where is his resignation letter? Have you ever presented it? Why has Chairman Zheng Cunzhu repeatedly demanded that you show his resignation letter to all party members, yet you have never been able to produce it?

If you cannot present the letter, yet continue to spread lies, fabricating them a thousand times over as if they were the truth—what is your real intention?

Even if, for the sake of argument, Zheng Cunzhu had submitted a resignation letter, which article of the party charter grants you the authority to convene a secret meeting behind the chairman’s back and unilaterally “suspend” him?

You claim you were acting according to the party charter—then show us the specific rule that allows you to do this! If you cannot, then you are guilty of nothing less than a despicable coup.

A chairman elected by the Party Congress can only be removed by another Party Congress. No other body has the authority to override this decision.

Even under extraordinary circumstances, the chairman may convene a Special Party Congress to discuss temporary measures, but any decision made must still be ratified by the next Party Congress.

Most importantly, Chairman Zheng Cunzhu has publicly and repeatedly stated that he never submitted a resignation letter.

Even if—hypothetically—he had at some point considered resigning, he withdrew the request before the Party Congress accepted it. Until his resignation is officially ratified, he remains the legitimate chairman, and no other party body has the power to override this.

Thus, the actions of Jie Lijian, Lan Wei, Qin Xiquan, and Li Xiaolong constitute a deliberate, sinister, and disgraceful coup within the party.

3. Jie Lijian’s Illegal Re-Registration of a Fake “China Democracy Party General Headquarters” Should Be Prosecuted

Jie Lijian’s unauthorised registration of a false “China Democracy Party General Headquarters” is illegal and should be pursued through legal action.

By doing so, he has effectively severed himself from the original China Democracy Party General Headquarters.

As for Lan Wei, Qin Xiquan, and Li Xiaolong, despite knowing this to be a blatant violation, you persist in supporting this coup. You must reflect on and correct your actions to salvage any credibility.

Otherwise, you should all be expelled from the China Democracy Party General Headquarters.

Wang Xizhe

Founder of the Overseas Branch and Former Permanent Chairman of the General Headquarters of China Democracy Party

16 February 2025

2025年2月13日，在中国外交部长王毅对英国进行正式访问期间，伦敦市中心中国大使馆前出现了一场抗议示威活动。由中国民主党英国总部的成员组成，我们聚集在大使馆外，高举标语牌，口号声此起彼伏，要求关注中国国内日益恶化的人权状况，呼吁释放政治犯，并批评中国政府对异见人士的镇压。 

在示威现场，中国民主党英国总部党员，抗议活动总指挥成小丹，副总指挥何智威分别接受了国际媒体的采访。他们在接受美国之音和自由亚洲之声采访时表示：“中国没有真正的言论自由，也没有保障基本人权。我们走上街头，就是为了让世界看到中国政府对异见声音的压制，我们必须为民主和自由发声。”另一位抗议者则用“战狼总教头”这一词汇严厉抨击王毅，认为其此次访英行程是在为中共的专制统治“披上国际外交的外衣”。 

据现场观察员和部分国际媒体报道，当日示威总体保持和平，警方在现场保持戒备，确保集会秩序不致失控。党员的举动被解读为对中国政府一贯人权记录的持续抗议，同时也反映出部分海外异见人士对中国外交行动的强烈不满。 此外，另一部分报道指出，示威活动不仅引起了英国政界和社会各界的关注，也使得外界再次聚焦于中英双边关系中如何平衡经济外交与人权议题。我们作为中国民主党英国总部的成员，代表着对中国现行政治体制和专制统治的深切批评，同时也希望借此敦促英国政府在处理中外关系时，更多考虑普世价值和人权保障问题。 

总体来看，2025年2月13日这场示威活动不仅是王毅访英行程中的一个插曲，更是海外华人和部分异见人士持续发声、呼吁政治改革的一次重要行动。中国民主党英国总部借由这一平台表达了对中国政府内外政策的尖锐质疑，也反映出国际社会对中国人权状况和民主发展问题的长期关注。 

活动组织人：成小丹、何智威 出席党员：何智威、张学美、黄俊、范可为、廖柳燕、靳雪涔、戴超、赵玉莲、韦崇华、邬勇、成小丹、刘立岩。 

中国民主党英国总部何智威报道

Protest by the UK Headquarters of China Democracy Party in Front of the Chinese Embassy During Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s Visit to the UK

On 13 February 2025, during the official visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to the United Kingdom, a protest took place outside the Chinese Embassy in central London. Organised by members of the UK Headquarters of China Democracy Party, demonstrators gathered outside the embassy, holding placards and chanting slogans to draw attention to China’s deteriorating human rights situation. The protest called for the release of political prisoners and condemned the Chinese government’s suppression of dissent.

At the protest site, Cheng Xiaodan, the chief coordinator of the demonstration, and He Zhiwei, the deputy coordinator, gave interviews to international media. Speaking to Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, they stated, “There is no real freedom of speech in China, nor are basic human rights protected. We have taken to the streets to show the world how the Chinese government suppresses dissenting voices. We must speak up for democracy and freedom.” Another protester criticised Wang Yi, referring to him as the “chief instructor of wolf warrior diplomacy”, arguing that his visit to the UK was an attempt to cloak the CCP’s authoritarian rule in the guise of international diplomacy.

According to on-site observers and reports from international media, the demonstration remained peaceful overall, with police maintaining security to ensure public order. The protest was widely interpreted as a continued condemnation of China’s human rights record and an expression of discontent among overseas dissidents towards the Chinese government’s diplomatic manoeuvres. Additionally, some reports noted that the protest drew attention from British political circles and civil society, reigniting discussions on how UK-China relations should balance economic diplomacy with human rights concerns.

As members of the UK Headquarters of China Democracy Party, we represent a strong critique of China’s current political system and authoritarian rule. Through this demonstration, we sought to urge the British government to prioritise universal values and human rights protections when engaging with China.

Overall, the protest on 13 February 2025 was not just a side event during Wang Yi’s visit but a significant action by overseas Chinese and dissidents to continue calling for political reform. The UK Headquarters of China Democracy Party used this platform to express sharp criticism of the Chinese government’s domestic and foreign policies, while also reflecting the international community’s ongoing concerns over human rights and democratic development in China.

Organisers: Cheng Xiaodan, He Zhiwei

Attending members: He Zhiwei, Zhang Xuemei, Huang Jun, Fan Kewei, Liao Liuyan, Jin Xuecen, Dai Chao, Zhao Yulian, Wei Chonghua, Wu Yong, Cheng Xiaodan, Liu Liyan.

Report by He Zhiwei, UK Headquarters of China Democracy Party

时间地点： 2025年2月8日，伦敦旧皇家铸币厂前（Royal Mint Court），该地为中共拟用于建设欧洲最大“超级大使馆”的选址。 事件概述： 当天下午约2时，来自香港、藏区、维吾尔族以及英国内部各界人士约3000至4000名抗议者涌向旧皇家铸币厂前。他们高举标语、挥舞横幅，强烈反对中共政府在伦敦扩张海外影响力，并担忧新使馆将成为中共“间谍基地”及跨境镇压的工具。 

现场经过： 集结与扩散： 抗议活动自下午2时启动，多地组织者协调包车，将来自曼彻斯特、伯明翰、谢菲尔德等地的示威者送往伦敦。现场人群迅速聚集，部分抗议者因人数众多，逐步涌出预定集会区域，导致部分街道短时封闭，交通一度受到影响。 警方介入与秩序维护： 由于现场规模较大，伦敦警方迅速出动多辆警车和上百名警员前来维持秩序。部分示威者因违反公共集会规定被警方短暂拘留，确保现场秩序得以控制。 

各界发声： 现场不仅有普通抗议者，也有多位英国国会议员及地方代表到场支持。他们发言指出，中共新使馆不仅有悖于英国民众的安全与自由，更可能危及国家安全。部分议员强调，政府在面对中共压力时应坚守原则，绝不向威权势力低头。 

中国民主党英国总部的参与： 值得注意的是，“中国民主党英国总部”也派代表和党员出席了此次示威活动。该组织通过社交平台表示，此次行动是海外华人共同捍卫民主自由的重要举措，其代表在现场重申：“只有坚守自由与民主，我们才能有效抵制中共在海外的扩张行为。” 

后续情况： 随着抗议持续数小时，现场秩序在警方的引导下逐步恢复平静，但抗议者的声音和相关讨论在社交媒体上持续发酵。活动主办方表示，后续将继续密切关注英国政府对该使馆建设申请的审议进程，并计划适时组织后续行动以表达民意。 

出席党员名单：何智威、戴超、戴雪梅、赵玉莲、邓伟、黄天、范可为、周勇、胡晓、黄俊、张学美、杨溯、成小丹、成亚利、王宇峻、俞滨、程敏、魏辰雨、曾福、韦崇华、王建、邬勇、李皓博、林明强、兰子明、顾晓峰、Thomas Hao。 

中国民主党英国总部记者何智威报道

Large-Scale Protest in Front of London’s “Super Embassy” Site – UK Headquarters of China Democracy Party Actively Participates

Date and Location:

On 8 February 2025, a protest was held in front of Royal Mint Court, London, the proposed site for what would be the largest “super embassy” of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Europe.

Event Overview:

At around 2:00 PM, between 3,000 and 4,000 protesters from various backgrounds—including Hong Kongers, Tibetans, Uyghurs, and other communities across the UK—gathered in front of Royal Mint Court. Holding placards and banners, they strongly opposed the CCP’s expansion of influence in London, voicing concerns that the new embassy could serve as a Chinese intelligence hub and a tool for transnational repression.

Protest Developments:

• Mobilisation and Crowd Growth:

The protest began at 2:00 PM, with organisers coordinating transport from Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield, and other cities, bringing demonstrators to London. The crowd quickly expanded, and due to the large turnout, some protesters spilled beyond the designated protest area, leading to temporary street closures and minor disruptions to local traffic.

• Police Intervention and Order Maintenance:

Given the large-scale demonstration, London police swiftly deployed multiple patrol cars and over a hundred officers to maintain order. Some protesters were briefly detained for violating public assembly regulations, ensuring that overall order was controlled.

• Voices from Various Sectors:

The protest was attended not only by ordinary demonstrators but also by several British Members of Parliament and local representatives, who openly expressed support for the movement. In their speeches, they highlighted the risks posed by the new Chinese embassy, warning that it could threaten public freedoms and national security in the UK. Some MPs urged the government to stand firm against CCP influence, emphasising that Britain must not yield to authoritarian pressure.

Participation of the UK Headquarters of China Democracy Party:

A notable aspect of the protest was the active participation of the UK Headquarters of China Democracy Party, which sent representatives and party members to the demonstration. The organisation stated on social media that this protest was a vital effort by overseas Chinese to defend democracy and freedom. At the scene, its representatives reaffirmed:

“Only by upholding freedom and democracy can we effectively resist the CCP’s overseas expansion.”

Follow-up Developments:

The protest lasted several hours, and order was gradually restored under police guidance. However, the demonstrators’ voices and discussions about the event continued to spread across social media. Organisers stated that they would closely monitor the British government’s review process regarding the embassy construction application and plan further actions to reflect public opposition in due course.

Attending Party Members:

He Zhiwei, Dai Chao, Dai Xuemei, Zhao Yulian, Deng Wei, Huang Tian, Fan Kewei, Zhou Yong, Hu Xiao, Huang Jun, Zhang Xuemei, Yang Su, Cheng Xiaodan, Cheng Yali, Wang Yujun, Yu Bin, Cheng Min, Wei Chenyu, Zeng Fu, Wei Chonghua, Wang Jian, Wu Yong, Li Haobo, Lin Mingqiang, Lan Ziming, Gu Xiaofeng, Thomas Hao.

Report by He Zhiwei, UK Headquarters of China Democracy Party

中国民主党英国总部程敏供稿

2025年2月6日，受西藏流亡政府驻日内瓦代表桑杰嘉和驻英国代表次仁央吉邀请，中国民主党英国总部的十位代表出席了在西藏流亡政府驻伦敦办事处举行的中国民主与宗教自由交流会。独立中文笔会会长、旅英作家马建先生也应邀出席。会议聚焦于中国民主及宗教自由的过去、现状与未来，每一位与会人员都根据自身的经历与想法分享了各自的观点。

次仁央吉女士表示，为了保存藏族传统文化，西藏流亡政府自始至终追求的都是通过和平手段，愿意在一个中国的领土框架内保持高度和真正的自治，不寻求独立。所以，在这个原则下，我们要和中国人民友好相处。桑杰嘉表示，坚决反对中国政府对藏人信仰自由与生存空间的极力压迫，但是我们绝不是反对中国人。他提到，从今年9月份开始，西藏社团将举行为期一年的庆祝活动，庆祝尊者达赖喇嘛90岁大寿。他说，我们欢迎大家来参加我们的活动。他说，藏人组织长期以来鼓励藏人主动与海外追求民主自由的华人友好相处、互帮互助，团结起来面对我们共同的独裁者敌人，也即是中国共产党。黄华表示，只有在一个民主和法制的中国内，才有可能真正地解决中国的少数民族问题。

马建先生回忆了他在西藏居住赫然生活的日子。他对如何有效地宣传尊者达赖喇嘛的形象和理念提出了自己的建议。

党员们表示，我们坚信，在任何土地上，信仰自由的前提与根基都是政治的民主化，中国民主党的核心政治纲领是以和平，理性、非暴力的手段推动中国的民主化，而我们的宗教理念中第一条便是——中国民主党主张所有华人有权自由选择任何宗教信仰。我们的很多理念与西藏流亡政府不谋而合，希望未来就中国的民主化事业，可以加强双方的合作与交流，共同推动中国早日实现民主化与宗教信仰自由。

会谈接受以后，次仁央吉女士带领大家参观了办事处，并在尊者达赖喇嘛画像前合影留念。

本次活动中出席的中国民主党英国总部代表成员有——黄华、何智威、戴超，成小丹，成亚利、Yong Zhou、黄天，小朱，小韦，范可为，程敏

Discussing China’s Democracy and Religious Freedom: Promoting Cooperation and Exchange Among Overseas Anti-CCP Groups

Report by Cheng Min, UK Headquarters of China Democracy Party

On 6 February 2025, at the invitation of Sangay Gyatso, Representative of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile in Geneva, and Tsering Yangkyi, Representative in the UK, ten representatives from the UK Headquarters of China Democracy Party attended a symposium on China’s Democracy and Religious Freedom held at the London Office of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. The event was also attended by Ma Jian, President of the Independent Chinese PEN Centre and a UK-based writer.

The symposium focused on the past, present, and future of democracy and religious freedom in China. Each participant shared their perspectives based on their own experiences and insights.

Tsering Yangkyi emphasised that, in order to preserve Tibetan traditional culture, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile has always pursued a peaceful approach and is willing to seek genuine and high-degree autonomy within the framework of One China, without seeking independence. She reiterated that, under this principle, Tibetans should strive for friendly relations with the Chinese people.

Sangay Gyatso firmly opposed the Chinese government’s oppression of Tibetans’ religious freedom and survival space, but clarified that Tibetans are not against the Chinese people. He mentioned that, starting in September this year, Tibetan communities would host a year-long celebration to mark the 90th birthday of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, and warmly welcomed everyone to participate. He stated that Tibetan organisations have long encouraged Tibetans to establish friendships and mutual support with overseas Chinese who pursue democracy and freedom, so that together, they can unite against their common enemy—the Chinese Communist Party.

Huang Hua stated that only in a democratic and rule-of-law China can the issue of ethnic minorities truly be resolved.

Writer Ma Jian shared his memories of living in Tibet, recalling his experiences there. He also offered suggestions on how to effectively promote the image and philosophy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

Party members expressed their firm belief that political democratisation is the fundamental prerequisite for religious freedom in any land. They reiterated that the core political programme of the China Democracy Party is to promote China’s democratisation through peaceful, rational, and non-violent means. Furthermore, the first principle of the party’s stance on religion is that all Chinese people should have the right to freely choose any religious belief. Many of these ideals align with those of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, and the UK Headquarters of China Democracy Party hopes to enhance cooperation and exchange with Tibetans in the future to jointly advance democracy and religious freedom in China.

Following the discussions, Tsering Yangkyi gave the attendees a tour of the office and led them to take a group photo in front of a portrait of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

Attendees from the UK Headquarters of China Democracy Party

Huang Hua, He Zhiwei, Dai Chao, Cheng Xiaodan, Cheng Yali, Yong Zhou, Huang Tian, Xiao Zhu, Xiao Wei, Fan Kewei, Cheng Min

Junius Tian

中共政权的周围向来不缺自带干粮的“五毛”，而当代中国也恰好不乏具备“自干五”人格特质的人。

自从习近平同志的社会主义铁拳在一系列“指明方向”的举措后不断落下，我在自干五的口中听到了无数次“已觉醒”。曾几何时，自干五的“觉醒”是那样的珍贵，以至于每当一个自干五“觉醒”，都值得人们大张旗鼓地庆祝一番、感动一番。而如今，这种“觉醒”终于也变得如同中国制造一般廉价。不同的是，“觉醒”的形式各有千秋，而“觉醒”的原因却总是千篇一律。

自Covid 动态清零政策实施以来，中国经历了从全民自干五到全民“觉醒”的逆潮流发展，其迅速且富有戏剧性的程度令人惊讶。其中，中国留学生群体和精致伪小资们更是为我们贡献了其间最大的节目效果，让我们亲眼目睹了中国的Z世代是如何在短短时间内，从高喊“操你妈逼，你妈死了”迅速切换到“不要封控要吃饭，8964天安门”。

在这个全民“觉醒”的时代，一切似乎都在悄然变化，又似乎一切都始终如一。曾经的自干五高喊着与昨日截然相反的口号，却像一块刷了新漆的旧地板，仍难掩日夜发出的吱吱作响。当我们站在这个中国大门逐渐关闭的新时代蓦然回首，不禁要问：

在那个尚存推动变革希望的时代，究竟是什么让这样一个群体选择良心沉睡，为虎作伥？而在今日这长夜难明的新时代，又是什么促使他们在短短一两年内突然“觉醒”？当他们口口声声说“觉醒”时，究竟意味着什么？

忠诚教育说的荒诞

人们长期以来说着这样一个善意的谎言，中共政权的忠诚教育强大而成功，以至于那些“善良”而无知的自干五在这样的教育下长期被蒙蔽。然而，当我们摒弃自欺欺人的幻想，正视现实，就会发现——中共的忠诚教育，如同它治下的万事万物一般，始终逃不脱瓦房店化的命运。

在中国境内大大小小的教育机构中，无论是忠诚教育的执行者，还是其接受者，始终都在敷衍了事。那些做题家们口中喊着最漂亮的“自由、平等、公正、法治”，却在现实生活的方方面面处处回避与中共当局谈论“自由、平等、公正、法治”。

中共忠诚教育的实际效力，无非是一件连孩子都能轻易戳破的“皇帝新衣”。马克思主义者的傲慢使得中共政权一向吝于伪装，它的专制生硬而丑陋，统治逻辑也如所有马克思主义左棍的人格一般——鲜廉寡耻。

他们既不像普京政权那样，操控一个体面的“全民大选”以赋予自身执政合法性；也不像海湾国家那样，试图在神权和传统中寻找统治依据。他们建立了一个高喊“人人平等”，却在每个角落都渗透傲慢与优越感的社会，统治着一个声称“人民当家作主”，却连小学班长都要内定的国家。

即便如此，仍然有人坚称，自己被当局那套敷衍了事的忠诚教育洗脑长达数十年。这种说法，是多么的荒谬和讽刺。

一个人之所以成为自干五，从来不是因为接受了中共的忠诚教育；同样，一个人之所以成为自由派，也并非因为后天“觉醒”。所有的一切，只是一个简单的本质主义问题。

哪有什么“岁月静好”都是一场自欺欺人

与“觉醒”相对应的另一个词是“岁静”，即“岁月静好”之意，形容那些生于中国却声称自己不关心政治的人。然而，在我看来，“岁静”是一个伪命题，因为在左翼极权主义的统治下，没有人能真正置身事外。

我们不能苛责每一个自称“岁静”的人，因为在中国，持不同政见者也许不得不伪装“岁静”，以换取最基本的人身安全。然而，更多情况下，那些宣称自己“岁静”的人，要么是在“装外宾”，要么是在扮演“客观中立”。

中国社交媒体上充斥着“装外宾”的岁静者——那些湾区做题家和法拉盛经济移民在小红书上假装“岁静”，一方面摆出高高在上的“高等华人”姿态，在中国的劳苦大众面前炫耀优越感；另一方面，又故作客观地为中共政权低人权优势取得的经济成就沾沾自喜。

与此同时，中国各大城市CBD的伪小资们也不甘落伍的在装“岁静”。廉价的虚荣心驱使他们，即便亲身经历了极权政治带来的痛苦和压抑，仍肉麻地喊着“阿中哥哥加油”。他们假装着外宾，在极权主义的土地上东施效颦地说着欧美现代“自由派”的后现代主义潮词。

“哪有什么岁月静好，不过是有人替你负重前行。” 这句话本是中国网络审查环境下，“带路党”们为身陷囹圄的异见人士和人权活动家默默祈祷的暗语。可谁曾想到，在兔杂自干五和各路低能缝合怪的无限解构下，它竟沦为一条恶臭不堪的谄媚之词，成了奉承中共军警走狗的阿谀。

对中国的自干五而言，他们所享受的“岁静”，背后确实有人替他们负重前行。只是，这负重前行之人，并不是中共的军警，而是那些他们口中的“公知”——那些抗争恶法的709律师，那些尚存良知的网络大V，那些身陷囹圄却被他们讥讽和遗忘的“恨国”群体。他们的存在或许带不来中国的民主化，却迫使中共不得不考虑国际影响，尽力粉饰所谓的社会主义人权与法治。

即便如此，这些坚守着他人岁静的破墙，终究在自干五的欢呼声和社会主义铁拳的疾风暴雨下轰然倒塌。自干五们在日益严苛的审查下，一边自欺欺人地幻想着“岁月静好”，一边又为虎作伥，撕咬那些被打倒的“洋奴公知”。

他们不敢直视真正的暴政，却将一切苦难归咎于中国根本不存在的“资本”，但凡铁拳落下，便跪在马克思主义僭主脚下扇着自己耳光大呼“奴才该死。”可笑的是，他们的所作所为，正在亲手加速终结自己身为奴才的“好日子”。而这一切丑态，何其相似于千百年来，那些围观刑场、分食死囚血肉的京城百姓。

XX岁，已觉醒

当他们终于发现，自己无法稳坐“岁静”后，我们这群有节目效果的自干五“同胞”们，终于“觉醒”了。

他们的“觉醒”来得如此猝不及防，不知情者还以为他们要掀起一场法国大革命，谁曾想，他们不过是在搞一场维权革命——一场彻头彻尾只关乎自身利益的“革命”。

13岁，已觉醒，是康米——因为中共推出“防沉迷”游戏禁令；
23岁，已二觉，是毛左——因为恶劣的外资环境让他们“毕业即失业”；
33岁，已三觉，是安人——因为他们发现，自己千辛万苦复读考研，却对未来毫无助益；
43岁，已四觉，是社民——因为他们即将迎来中年失业；
53岁，已五觉，盼毛归——因为他们发现，社会主义政权能让他辛苦半生的银行存款一夜变为一张废纸；
63、73岁，已N 觉，白发革命——因为他们发现，自己倾尽一生缴纳的“医保”，却难“保”一辈子辛劳所致的慢性病。

他们举着毛泽东这头僭主的遗照“觉醒”了，却觉醒得像靖难之役后的明朝士子，自认怀才不遇，却依旧死心塌地忠于朱皇帝。他们拉出“先皇”的画像，嚎啕大哭：“倘若先皇朱八八还在，事情何至于此！”

他们学着鲁迅的口吻，嘲笑古人的麻木与愚昧，却转身便为自己这场盼明君、哭先皇的丑剧，披上了一层“后现代”的外衣。

他们“觉醒”后，怀念李克强，怀念薄熙来，怀念胡锦涛，怀念江泽民，怀念邓小平，甚至怀念毛泽东。他们喃喃念叨：“马克思本意是好的，都是下面的人执行歪了。”可他们却唯独没有怀念过的是，那曾为他们争取自由而遭迫害，被他们恶毒中伤过的人。从未想起那被他们揶揄过的loser赵紫阳，想起那被他们斥为洋奴尸骨无存的刘晓波，想起被他们调侃“王师还剩几个连”的民国派知识分子，想起那被他们恶毒戏称为“五对负重轮”馅饼的六四亡魂。

今天，他们在压抑的中国社交媒体上“阴阳怪气”，在大使馆前高喊“八九六四天安门”，可就在昨日，他们还曾在微博、豆瓣、贴吧上，用最恶毒、最腌臜的语言，咒骂那些曾一心想为他们带来自由的人们。

无数有良知而勇敢的人倒下，无数灵魂在痛苦的呻吟下结束了悲惨的一生，而最终，历史的回音却只有你一句——XX岁，已觉醒。

他们因何而醒？

2018年，在各路“盼明君”的自干五期盼下，习近平同志正式修宪登基，撕掉了马克思主义左棍极权统治的遮羞布。

自此，“已觉醒”和“别发外网”的笑话便在中国的魔幻现实中不断交织。Covid动态清零后，自干五们更是恨不得年均觉醒8964次。

他们“觉醒”后，自诩客观中立的分析西式民主自由是如何地效率低，讥讽王丹、魏京生这些满口民主的过时“老东西”。他们谈论着最潮、最批爆的前卫政治潮流，却向来对中共暴政下被剥夺话语权者缺乏同情心。他们对中共政权下的基本民主人权状况避而不谈，一面口口声声声援女性和性少数群体的权利，却又迎合西方大学退步左翼的论调，力挺恐怖组织和宗教极端主义。

这一次，他们彻底“觉醒”了——和古代那些动辄“文死谏”的酸腐文人不同，他们学会了伪激进式的“死谏”。高等教育质量的滑坡与学位泛滥教会他们这种人用后现代主义话术回避中共政权下民主人权状况的日益恶化，却大谈民主国家的“系统性压迫”和“种族歧视”，每每提及中共政权及该政权相关人物，却依旧不改“青天大老爷”和“先帝明君”。他们曾经如此仇恨民主与自由，每每提起必称“皿煮目田”加以嘲弄，而今在他们“觉醒”后，依旧秉持同样“质朴”的内心，高呼民主便是免费住房、免费福利、免费医疗、免费教育，而自由则是他们拥有全世界、以他们的喜怒哀乐为中心的权力。

他们因此“觉醒”，正如他们的祖辈如何为一亩三分地而双手沾满自己保护者的鲜血，正如他们的父辈如何为蝇头小利而选择坐视义人死去，厉声质问着所谓“公知”民主能干饭否，却又谦卑的向僭主交出自由的权利。

请勿二觉

自干五终于悄悄收起了“皿煮目田”，也学着“恨国党”和“50万”们讲起了“民主自由”，却依旧用社会达尔文主义来诠释他们所理解的“民主自由”。他们仍然习惯性地将人分为三六九等，依然一开口辩论就“拍房产证、亮户口本”，或像酸腐秀才般炫耀那早已滥发到毫无价值的学历。

他们与西方大学里的香槟社会主义者一拍即合，一边在互联网上声称反对他们的人是“失败者”、“低学历者”，一边又自诩代表弱势群体和工人阶级。他们自负又自大地指点江山、激扬文字，研究应如何在西方资本主义国家里搞激进左翼革命，玩弄政治正确为自己牟利。可他们却从未同情过与自己政见不合却热爱自由的弱势群体和穷人，从未用同理心感受过未受西方资本主义“文化霸权”影响的传统国家里，专制是如何的黑暗压抑，普通人又是如何血泪艰辛。

他们当然“觉醒”了——他们一直都是醒着的。自他们出生之日起，刻在 DNA 里的社会达尔文主义信仰便已觉醒；欺软怕硬、畏威不畏德的个性便已觉醒；虚荣与自以为是便已觉醒；自干五的人格便已觉醒。他们根本不必等到今天才说：“XX 岁，已觉醒。”

自干五“已觉醒”，代价是成千上万义人长眠于暴政的寒冬；其实你也不必觉醒，因为没人有兴趣看一场反复变换自我感动的独角俄狄浦斯王剧。

When the voluntary wumao say they have Awakened, what do they really mean?

Junius Tian

Many Westerners concerned with China’s democracy and human rights are familiar with the term “wumao,” referring to state-funded pro-Communist trolls. However, they may not know that there is also a group of Chinese citizens who voluntarily support the Communist Party’s rule. They call themselves ziganwu, meaning “voluntary wumao.”

In China’s online communities, there was once a large number of voluntary wumao, with anti-Western rhetoric and hateful comments towards other ethnic groups being widespread. For a long time, democracy and freedom were seen as derogatory terms by Chinese netizens. On the Chinese internet, any moderate or inclusive opinion, or sympathy for democratic values, would be reported by the voluntary wumao.

However, this trend has dramatically reversed with the implementation of China’s “Zero-COVID” policy. The voices of voluntary wumao on the Chinese internet have grown silent, while a large influx of Chinese economic immigrants has flooded the U.S.-Mexico border. Among the fastest to shift their stance are the Chinese students abroad. Just a few years ago, they were using the harshest curses against Hong Kong protesters and Chinese dissenters, yet today, they stand side by side with their former enemies, but what they shouting is “We need food, not lockdowns.”

In a striking parallel to the Western awakening movements, China has also witnessed its own version of an awakening among the voluntary wumao. Initially, many believed this movement would serve as a turning point for political and social reform in China. However, as the Chinese version of the “awakening” progressed, many came to realize that things were not so simple. The voluntary wumao lamented the economic pains their lives endured, yet directed their hatred toward “capitalism” and the so-called “imperialist forces.”

Everything in China is quietly changing, but no one knows whether this will lead the red dragon to become more open or steer it down a more conservative, traditional Communist path.

A well-intentioned lie — they have been brainwashed

In the eyes of Westerners, there is always the fairytale belief that a righteous and kind people will ultimately triumph over tyranny. When I was a child, I believed this story without question, and it played a large part in shaping me into a liberal. I loved this story, much like I loved the Brothers Grimm tales. Yet as I grew older, I came to understand a truth: political reality is not a fairytale. When we consider whether great values and political systems can be established, we cannot ignore their compatibility with specific cultures and societies. It’s like imagining that if Snow White had not met the prince, but had instead encountered China’s Dong Zhimin, the ending of the fairytale might have been very different.

Kind-hearted people are often reluctant to confront the harsh reality of things, which is why they invent fairytales. One such fairytale is “They have been brainwashed.” Many attribute the large number of voluntary wumao in China to the Communist Party’s extensive loyalty propaganda in education. However, the truth is that most of those who execute and receive this propaganda do so half-heartedly. In China’s compulsory education system, teachers also teach students some vague concepts of freedom and equality. Many Chinese students understand the meaning of these terms. Yet, on one hand, they avoid discussing freedom and equality with the Chinese authorities, and on the other, they mock the liberal democratic values of the U.S. and Western countries.

For those living in China, the Communist Party’s authoritarian rule is stark and unambiguous. Unlike Putin’s regime, which employs intricate methods to manipulate elections for legitimacy, or the theocratic systems of the Gulf states that base their rule on religious authority and tradition, the Chinese regime operates on a fundamentally materialistic form of totalitarianism. It is rooted in rigid social Darwinism and extreme self-interest.

The Chinese Marxist regime’s propaganda bears Orwellian traits of doublethink, but its methods of brainwashing lack depth, making their lies as fragile as the emperor’s new clothes. On one hand, the government promotes China as a country where the people rule, while on the other, the Communist Party openly displays its autocratic nature. They even infuse Marxist ideology’s inherent arrogance and bureaucratic traits into primary education. Anyone who has grown up in China and gone through elementary school can clearly feel how apparent authoritarianism and totalitarianism are in the country.

In the days before the Chinese authorities invested as many resources into censorship as they do today, there was a persistent undercurrent of mild criticism and subtle satire within China’s online society. In many communities with a stronger liberal atmosphere, private criticism of the Communist Party was not uncommon. However, these anti-authoritarian voices were always in the minority. During those years, many Chinese internet dissenters believed the myth that “they had been brainwashed,” and so they tirelessly explained the meaning of democratic values and debated why people needed love and fraternity instead of social Darwinism. The response they always received was: “Can democracy be eaten? Can love and fraternity be eaten?”

Voluntary wumao once mocked democratic values with the deepest malice, ridiculing how equality and fraternity were mere hypocrisies. They used the harshest social Darwinist logic to challenge the last remnants of human kindness. Now, they claim to have “awakened” and become democracy fighters. I cannot understand whether they have truly become good people, or if they have simply realized that democracy can be “eaten.”

Self-deception — when you live in China and don’t care about politics

Another of the favorite excuses of the “awakened” voluntary wumao is that they never cared about Chinese politics before the zero-Covid policy. They claim it was precisely this ignorance of politics that led them to fervently support a tyrannical regime—mocking its victims without remorse and deriding those who sacrificed their freedom to fight for other’s freedom.

But the truth is that in China, no one has the luxury of ignoring politics. Every citizen is either an unwilling cog in the machinery of totalitarianism or one of its victims. Even the most cloistered intellectual, upon switching on the television, stepping outside, or merely glancing at the omnipresent communist propaganda slogans plastered across city streets, finds it impossible to avoid political thought. Traditional autocracies silence their subjects; Marxist dictatorships, by contrast, compel participation. Dissent is not merely punished—it is publicly denounced, forcing people to declare allegiance or face ostracism.

For someone living in such a system to claim they have “never cared about politics” is to make one of two admissions: either they are flaunting their privilege, boasting that they alone can exist above the fray, untouched by oppression, or they are feigning neutrality to lend themselves an air of objectivity. Indeed, China has its own breed of modern liberals—people who mimic Western progressive rhetoric while professing disinterest in politics within their own country. The vast majority of these modern liberals, in fact, are voluntary wumao—or, as some now claim, they are former voluntary wumao but today “awakened.”

In a sense, these individuals are a paradoxical amalgamation. While they understand the nature of the Chinese Communist Party’s rule, they simultaneously pretend to live in a free and democratic country. Their mouths often utter avant-garde political concepts like feminism and LGBT rights. Yet ironically, their engagement with these ideas is not rooted in conviction but in fashion, much like the Shanghai socialites of the last century who sprinkled their speech with foreign phrases to appear cosmopolitan.

This performative liberalism has been riddled with contradictions since its inception, much like the regressive leftists and champagne socialists of Western academia. They readily condemn “systemic racism” and so-called “human rights abuses” in the United States and Europe, yet remain conveniently silent on the escalating political repression within China itself. When Hong Kongers took to the streets to demand democratic rights, these self-styled champions of tolerance—ostensibly possessing the compassion of a middle-class moralist—firmly sided with the Chinese government, clamoring for the state to use force, even torture, against pro-democracy activists.

In truth, these so-called “don’t care about politics” Chinese modern liberals care deeply about politics—but only insofar as it is safe for them to do so. They skillfully sidestep any issue that might put them at risk while seamlessly aligning their radicalism with the ruling ideology. Like their Western “woke” counterparts, they embrace performative activism—except their ire is directed not at the tyrants who rule over people, but at the democratic world that tolerates their existence.

What has caused they late “awakening”?

No matter what, those former staunch supporters of the Chinese authorities have ultimately chosen to “awakened.” They had once clearly stated to the world, on several occasions, that as long as China’s economy continued to soar, providing them with endless opportunities to make money, principles like democracy, freedom, human rights, and humanitarianism were of no importance to them. Yet today, they hypocritically tell the world how much they now care about the very values they once despised and ridiculed.

They can even transform themselves into figures of inspiration, telling a moving “awakening” story in the United States, Canada, and across the world, presenting themselves in Congress as champions of freedom to win public sympathy. Yet, they have never sincerely apologized to those they once reported to the authorities and sent to prison, nor to those they persecuted. They have never apologized to the victims of the Tiananmen massacre, whom they once mockingly referred to as “59 tank meat patties.”

Yes, they have “awakened.” Their ideologies are varied—some call themselves Maoists, some claim to be Trotskyists, and others identify as anarchists. Despite the differences in their labels, their demands are unified. They now claim that democracy means free housing, free healthcare, free welfare, and free education, while freedom is the ability to make the world revolve around their whims and desires.

Their motives for awakening, much like those of their ancestors, are driven by petty self-interest—betraying their protectors for small gains, with their hands stained by the blood of landowners and entrepreneurs. When tyranny finally descends upon them, they play the victim, begging for other’s sympathy. Yet what truly hurts them is not the loss of freedom, but the fact that tyranny can no longer provide them with their “free” handouts.

In truth, they never needed to stage an “awakening”—because they were never asleep. They have always known exactly what they wanted, and it was never freedom or democracy. From the ancient Aegean civilizations to the Magna Carta, and finally to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the values forged through countless lives, blood, and tears are, to them, worth nothing — 0 pence.

作者：中国民主党记者俞滨 2025年1月20日

中国，作为全球最大且最为封闭的国家之一，其国内的言论和信息管制向来严密。国内民众无法自由访问全球社交平台，只有通过VPN等技术手段才能绕过这一封锁，而使用这些工具本身在中国也被视为违法行为。封锁限制了国内对外界的接触，讽刺的是，中国的跨国迫害影响力已经远远超出了国界，渗透到全球各地。

跨国迫害的背后，是一个精密且系统化的国家机器运作，它不依赖于单一形式的威胁，而是通过多样的手段和渠道，构成了一个在全球范围内不断扩张的恐惧体系。

我的朋友Lyndon Li之前为美国之音调查了一起前皇家海军陆战队员被指控为香港情报机构工作间谍的离奇死亡案件。死者与中国政府的间谍网络有关联。这一事件不仅暴露了中国跨国行动的深度，也突显了中国对外部世界进行渗透与干扰的恐怖。

类似的暴力事件并非个别。中国驻曼彻斯特总领事馆内的工作人员曾在2019年对香港抗议者实施暴力行为。一位在领馆外进行抗议的香港人遭到殴打，并被强行拖入领馆内。动用暴力来维护所谓的“国家尊严”。这种行径不仅直接威胁到受害者的人身安全，也挑战了人权的的基本保护。

在同一地点，中国领馆工作人员还曾威胁自由亚洲的记者，试图阻止其进行新闻报道。当记者在领馆门口拍摄时，工作人员声称该行为违反了《维也纳公约》中的外交特权，并扬言报警。虽然记者强调其拍摄的是公共区域，属于言论自由的范畴，但这些工作人员依然对记者进行了干扰和恐吓。

除了暴力和恐吓外，中国还通过国际刑警发布“红通”，将跨国追捕作为常规手段。许多被中国政府视为“威胁”的民主人士，甚至无辜的香港青年，均成为中国政府跨国打压的目标。一位19岁的香港女孩張晞晴因涉嫌“分裂国家”而被悬赏100万港币通缉。

我自己也曾遭遇过类似的跨国迫害。作为长期关注中国政治和人权的活动人士，我也曾被不明身份的人士袭击，伦敦警察局逮捕了袭击者，已经做出了起诉决定。

中国的跨国迫害系统是精密且具有全球扩张性的。无论是通过暴力、恐吓、间谍活动，还是利用外交手段限制言论自由，中国的跨国行动都在无形中侵蚀了全球的民主与人权空间。更重要的是，这一系统并非单纯的局部事件，而是一整套由国家机器驱动的全球性压制机制。

跨国迫害的力量，并非仅在于肉体上的伤害，而在于它让人们在无形中丧失了自我表达的权利，逐渐让恐惧成为无法摆脱的阴影。

而最危险的压迫，是在表达之前的恐惧。

China’s Transnational Persecution

By— Bin Yu, Journalist of China Democracy Party(UK) 20th, Jan, 2025

China, as one of the largest and most closed-off countries globally, has always maintained strict control over speech and information within its borders. Domestic citizens are unable to freely access global social platforms and can only bypass these blocks through technologies like VPNs, which are considered illegal in China. This censorship limits the domestic population’s interaction with the outside world, yet ironically, China’s transnational persecution influence stretches far beyond its borders, infiltrating nations across the globe.

Behind this transnational persecution lies a sophisticated and systematic state apparatus. It does not rely on a single form of threat but instead employs a variety of methods and channels, creating a growing system of fear that expands worldwide.

My friend Lyndon previously investigated the bizarre death of a former Royal Marine who was accused of working as a spy for Hong Kong intelligence agencies. The deceased had connections to China’s spy network. This case exposed not only the depth of China’s transnational operations but also highlighted China’s terrifying efforts to infiltrate and disrupt the external world.

Such violent incidents are not isolated. Staff at the Chinese Consulate in Manchester were involved in violent acts against Hong Kong protesters in 2019. A Hong Kong protester outside the consulate was beaten and forcibly dragged inside the consulate. This use of violence was purportedly to protect the so-called “national dignity.” Such actions not only directly endanger the safety of victims but also challenge fundamental human rights protections.

At the same location, consulate staff also threatened a journalist from Radio Free Asia in an attempt to prevent reporting. When the journalist was filming outside the consulate, staff claimed the action violated the diplomatic privileges outlined in the Vienna Convention and threatened to call the police. Despite the journalist’s clarification that the filming was in a public space, within the scope of free speech, the staff continued to harass and intimidate the reporter.

In addition to violence and intimidation, China also utilizes Interpol’s “Red Notice” to pursue transnational arrests as a routine method. Many individuals the Chinese government deems as “threats,” including innocent Hong Kong youth, have become targets of China’s global crackdown. A 19-year-old Hong Kong girl, Cheung Hei Ching. was even offered a reward of 1 million Hong Kong dollars for her capture on charges of “separatism.”

I myself have encountered similar transnational persecution. As a long-time advocate for Chinese politics and human rights, I have been attacked by individuals of unknown identity. The London Metropolitan Police arrested the assailant, and prosecution has already been decided.

China’s transnational persecution system is sophisticated and expansively global. Whether through violence, intimidation, espionage, or diplomatic means to restrict freedom of speech, China’s transnational actions subtly erode the global space for democracy and human rights. More importantly, this system is not merely a series of localized incidents but a comprehensive global suppression mechanism driven by the state apparatus.

The power of transnational persecution lies not only in the physical harm it causes but in its ability to gradually strip individuals of their right to self-expression, making fear an inescapable shadow.

And the deepest oppression, is the fear before expression.

 2025年1月17日，中国民主党英国总部声援维吾尔族社区代表，在伦敦泰国驻英大使馆门口发起抗议活动，呼吁泰国政府不要将48名被拘留的维吾尔族人士遣返中国，并敦促其采取行动，捍卫这些难民的基本人权。 

 2025年1月，泰国政府计划将被拘留的48名维吾尔族难民遣返中国的消息引发了国际社会的广泛关注和担忧。这些维吾尔族人于2013年和2014年逃离中国，寻求在土耳其重新定居，但在泰国被拘留至今，已有十余年。 据报道，泰国移民官员于1月8日要求这些被拘留者签署“自愿遣返”文件，但他们全部拒绝签署。人权组织和家属担心，一旦被遣返回中国，这些维吾尔族人可能面临监禁、酷刑，甚至失去生命的风险。2015年，泰国曾将109名维吾尔族人遣返中国，导致国际社会的强烈谴责。联合国人权专家在2024年2月曾致函泰国政府，指出对这些被拘留者的待遇可能违反国际法，并提醒泰国应遵守国际不驱回原则。 鉴于此，国际人权组织呼吁泰国政府停止遣返计划，遵守国际人权义务，确保这些维吾尔族难民的安全。他们强调，泰国应与国际人权机构合作，寻求解决方案，避免重蹈2015年的覆辙。 

 活动当天，抗议者手举标语，高呼“停止遣返”“保护难民权利”等口号，以引起国际社会对这批维吾尔族难民处境的关注。维吾尔族代表在现场发言，讲述了维吾尔族群体在中国遭受的迫害，并强调这些难民一旦被遣返，极有可能面临酷刑、监禁甚至生命威胁。泰国政府应该站在国际人道主义的一边，避免成为中国政府人权迫害的帮凶。” 

 抗议活动中，组织者和参与者联名签署了一封正式信件，并递交给泰国驻英大使馆的代表。信件中严正要求泰国政府遵守国际义务，拒绝将难民遣返至中国，同时与国际人权机构合作，确保这些难民得到公平的待遇和保护。

 此次中国民主党英国总部的抗议不仅是对被压迫的维吾尔族同胞的声援，更是对国际社会维护人权和捍卫正义的呼唤。维吾尔族难民问题不仅关乎人道主义，也直接反映了全球人权捍卫的现状。 

 中国民主党英国总部将继续与各界人士和组织一道，推动国际社会对维吾尔族困境的关注，并为受迫害者争取更多的国际支持。我们坚信，只有通过团结与努力，才能让每个人都享有自由与尊严的基本权利。

 出席活动党员：成小丹、成亚丽、何智威、Thomas Hao 

中国民主党英国总部记者成小丹报道

Stand in Solidarity with Uyghurs, Urge the Thai Government to Stop Deportation and Release Innocent Uyghur Individuals

January 17, 2025, Outside the Thai Embassy in London

On January 17, 2025, the UK Headquarters of the Chinese Democratic Party, in solidarity with representatives of the Uyghur community, organized a protest outside the Thai Embassy in London. The protest called on the Thai government to refrain from deporting 48 detained Uyghur individuals back to China and urged the government to take action to defend the basic human rights of these refugees.

In January 2025, the news that the Thai government planned to deport 48 detained Uyghur refugees to China sparked widespread international concern. These Uyghurs had fled China in 2013 and 2014, seeking resettlement in Turkey, but have been detained in Thailand for more than a decade.

Reports indicate that on January 8, Thai immigration officials asked the detainees to sign “voluntary deportation” documents, but all of them refused to sign. Human rights organizations and family members fear that if deported to China, these Uyghurs could face imprisonment, torture, or even death. In 2015, Thailand deported 109 Uyghurs to China, which led to strong international condemnation. In February 2024, UN human rights experts sent a letter to the Thai government, noting that the treatment of these detainees might violate international law, and reminding Thailand to uphold the principle of non-refoulement.

In light of this, international human rights organizations have called on the Thai government to halt the deportation plan, comply with international human rights obligations, and ensure the safety of these Uyghur refugees. They emphasized that Thailand should cooperate with international human rights organizations to seek a solution and avoid repeating the mistakes of 2015.

On the day of the protest, demonstrators held banners and chanted slogans such as “Stop Deportation” and “Protect Refugee Rights” to raise awareness of the plight of these Uyghur refugees. A representative from the Uyghur community spoke at the event, describing the persecution faced by the Uyghur people in China. The speaker stressed that these refugees, if deported, could face torture, imprisonment, and even life-threatening risks. Protesters called on the Thai government to align with international humanitarian principles and avoid becoming complicit in China’s human rights violations.

During the protest, the organizers and participants jointly signed an official letter, which was submitted to a representative at the Thai Embassy. The letter strongly urged the Thai government to fulfill its international obligations, refuse to deport the refugees to China, and cooperate with international human rights organizations to ensure that these refugees receive fair treatment and protection.

This protest organized by the UK Headquarters of the Chinese Democratic Party is not only an act of solidarity with the oppressed Uyghur community but also a call for the international community to uphold human rights and justice. The issue of Uyghur refugees is not only a humanitarian issue but also directly reflects the state of global human rights advocacy.

The UK Headquarters of the Chinese Democratic Party will continue to work with individuals and organizations worldwide to increase international attention to the plight of the Uyghurs and secure more international support for those persecuted. We firmly believe that only through unity and effort can every person enjoy the fundamental rights of freedom and dignity.

Participants in the event: Xiaodan Cheng ,Yali Cheng, Zhiwei He, Thomas Hao

Reporter: Xiaodan Cheng, Chinese Democratic Party UK Headquarters

中國在2024年經歷了一系列反社會事件，這些事件暴露出底層社會深刻的結構性問題與人權危機，並引發了國內外的廣泛關注。然而，中共政府對這些問題的回應仍顯得遲緩甚至迴避，使得人們對改善中國人權狀況的期望蒙上陰影。在2025年新的一年裡，中國政府如何改善人權現狀成為了關鍵議題。本文將探討2024年反社會事件的根源、中共政府的應對方式以及未來可能的改革方向。

2024年的反社會事件及其根源

2024年，中國多地爆發了一系列與底層民眾相關的反社會事件，包括工人集會抗議、農村土地糾紛、城鎮強拆衝突，以及涉及勞工剝削的極端暴力事件。一些地區的年輕人因缺乏工作機會和經濟壓力而陷入困境，最終選擇極端方式表達不滿。這些事件的根本原因可以歸納為：

經濟壓力增大：中國經濟增長放緩導致就業機會減少，特別是在製造業和服務業領域，許多農民工和大學生難以找到穩定工作。

社會不平等加劇：財富分配不均的問題越發嚴重，農村與城市、沿海與內陸地區的差距進一步擴大。

法律與監管缺失：底層民眾的權益無法通過法律手段得到有效保護，地方政府的強制手段引發民怨。

中共政府的回應

對於2024年的反社會事件，中共政府主要採取了以下策略：

加強控制與壓制：在社交媒體上嚴格審查相關信息，防止事件進一步發酵；對參與抗議的民眾進行逮捕或懲戒。

有限的經濟補償：對部分事件中的受害者提供經濟補償，但未觸及深層次的制度改革。

宣傳穩定的重要性：官方媒體集中宣傳“穩定壓倒一切”的理念，將事件歸咎於外部勢力煽動。

儘管如此，這些應對措施未能從根本上解決問題，甚至在某些地區引發更大的不滿。

2025年的改善方向

面對日益突出的社會問題和國內外壓力，中共政府在2025年需要採取更全面和負責的行動，以改善人權狀況和民生條件：

改革法律體系：加強對底層民眾權益的法律保護，確保土地糾紛、勞工權益等問題能通過公平的法律程序解決。

縮小貧富差距：推進財稅改革，加強對農村和貧困地區的扶持，創造更多公平的經濟機會。

提升社會透明度：允許媒體和民間組織參與監督，讓底層民眾的聲音能夠被傾聽和回應。

教育與培訓：為失業的年輕人和農民工提供技能培訓，幫助他們適應經濟轉型的需求。

國際合作：通過與國際組織合作，學習其他國家的成功經驗，推動人權保障的進一步制度化。

2024年的反社會事件是中國底層社會積累多年的結構性問題的集中爆發，這既是一個挑戰，也是一個契機。中共政府如果能在2025年採取積極而務實的改革措施，不僅能夠改善人權狀況，還能為國家發展注入新的動力。然而，如果政府選擇繼續迴避或壓制問題，則可能面臨更大的社會動盪與國際壓力。未來的中國需要一個更公平、更包容的社會結構，這是所有人共同努力的方向。

撰稿者：李亞倫

Summary of China’s Human Rights Situation and Improvement in 2024

China experienced a series of anti-social incidents in 2024, which exposed deep structural problems and human rights crises at the grassroots level and aroused widespread concern both domestically and internationally. However, the CCP government’s response to these issues has been slow or even evasive, overshadowing expectations for an improvement in China’s human rights situation. In the new year of 2025, how the Chinese government will improve the human rights situation will be a key issue. This article examines the root causes of the 2024 antisocial incidents, the Chinese Communist government’s response, and possible directions for future reform.

Anti-social incidents in 2024 and their root causes

In 2024, a series of anti-social incidents related to the grassroots erupted in many parts of China, including workers’ rallies and protests, rural land disputes, forced demolitions in cities and towns, and extreme violence involving labour exploitation. Young people in some districts, who are in dire straits due to the lack of job opportunities and financial pressure, have eventually chosen to express their discontent in an extreme manner. The root causes of these incidents can be summarised as follows:

Increased economic pressure: China’s slowing economic growth has led to a reduction in job opportunities, especially in the manufacturing and service sectors, where many migrant workers and university students have difficulty finding stable employment.

Worsening social inequality: The uneven distribution of wealth has become more serious, widening the gap between rural and urban areas and between coastal and inland areas.

Lack of law and regulation: The rights of the grassroots are not effectively protected through legal means, and the coercive measures of local governments have led to public discontent.

Response from the Chinese Communist Government

The CCP government has adopted the following strategies in response to the anti-social events of 2024:

Enhanced control and suppression: Strict censorship of information on social media to prevent further escalation; arrests and punishment of protestors.

Limited financial compensation: Financial compensation was offered to some victims of the incident, but did not touch on deeper systemic reforms.

Promotion of the importance of stability: The official media focused on the idea that ‘stability overrides everything’ and blamed external forces for instigating the events.

Nonetheless, these responses have failed to address the root causes of the problem, and have led to greater discontent in some areas.

Directions for Improvement in 2025

In the face of growing social problems and domestic and external pressures, the Chinese government will need to take more comprehensive and responsible action to improve the human rights situation and livelihood conditions in 2025:

Reform the legal system: Strengthen the legal protection of the rights of the grassroots and ensure that issues such as land disputes and labour rights can be resolved through fair legal procedures.

Reduce the wealth gap: Promote fiscal reform, strengthen support for rural and poor areas, and create more equitable economic opportunities.

Enhance social transparency: Allow the media and civil society organisations to participate in monitoring, so that the voices of the grassroots can be heard and responded to.

Education and Training: Provide skills training for unemployed young people and migrant workers to help them adapt to the demands of economic restructuring.

International Co-operation: Through co-operation with international organisations and learning from the successful experiences of other countries, we will promote the further institutionalisation of human rights protection.

The antisocial events of 2024 are a challenge but also an opportunity, as the structural problems of China’s underclass that have been accumulating for years have exploded in a concentrated manner. If the CCP government adopts positive and pragmatic reforms in 2025, it will not only improve the human rights situation, but also inject new momentum into the country’s development. However, if the government chooses to continue to avoid or suppress the issue, it could face greater social unrest and international pressure. The future of China needs a fairer and more inclusive social structure, and this is a direction we can all work towards.

Written by Yalun Li

2025年1月1日，中国民主党英国总部受邀参加了香港议会筹委会在伦敦O2举办的一场备受关注的活动——《自由香港宣言》发布会及问答宴会。这场活动吸引了来自世界各地的民主人士、香港移民社区代表以及媒体的广泛关注，为推动香港民主与自由事业再次注入了力量。

《自由香港宣言》发布：呼吁国际社会关注香港

在会上香港议会筹委会发起人袁弓夷先生发表了讲话。他说：《自由香港宣言》明确表示，香港的自治与自由不仅是香港人民的基本权利，也是国际社会共同维护的价值。宣言呼吁各国政府采取更强有力的行动，制裁破坏香港民主的相关人士和机构，敦促中国政府履行《中英联合声明》承诺。

袁弓夷表示：“自由与人权是普世价值，香港人民的抗争精神不会被历史遗忘。我们必须团结一致，让香港的声音被世界听见。”

发布会结束后，与会者参加了以“自由香港”为主题的晚宴。席间，大家深入交流，为共同的目标献计献策。气氛既庄重又温暖，展现了香港人在困境中依然团结一致的精神。

此次活动不仅是一场宣言的发布，更是一场团结的象征。中国民主党英国总部对香港议会筹委会的支持，显示了海外民主力量的凝聚力，也为未来更多的合作打下了基础。 活动结束后，许多参与者表示，这场发布会和晚宴让他们感受到了希望与力量，也更加坚定了继续为香港自由与民主奋斗的决心。

在活动结束前，中国民主党英国总部党员与其他所有参会者一起高唱了《愿荣光归香港》。激昂的歌声回荡在现场，现场气氛热烈而感人，许多人难掩内心的激动，眼中闪烁着泪光。这一刻，所有人仿佛重新找回了团结的力量和对自由的坚定信念，整个场面既庄严又充满希望。自由香港，人人有责！愿这场斗争的火种永不熄灭！

袁弓夷先生向中国民主党英国总部的支持表示感谢，并和参加党员合影留念。

本次活动组织者：成亚利，李皓博

参加本次活动的党员：成亚利，李皓博 、成小丹、顾晓峰、兰子明 、李景棠、王应如、何智威、王建，沈超、戴超、戴雪梅，赵玉莲，黄华。

中国民主党英国总部供稿人：李皓博

UK headquarters of China Democracy Party was invited to attend the Free Hong Kong Declaration Conference of the Hong Kong Parliament Preparatory Committee

On January 1, 2025, the UK headquarters of the China Democratic Party was invited to attend a highly anticipated event held by the Hong Kong Parliament Preparatory Committee at the O2 in London – the launch of the Free Hong Kong Declaration and a Q&A banquet. This event attracted widespread attention from democrats from all over the world, representatives of Hong Kong immigrant communities and the media, and once again injected strength into the cause of democracy and freedom in Hong Kong.

The Free Hong Kong Declaration was released: calling on the international community to pay attention to Hong Kong

At the meeting, Mr. Yuan Gongyi, the initiator of the Hong Kong Parliament Preparatory Committee, delivered a speech. He said: The Free Hong Kong Declaration clearly stated that Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedom are not only the basic rights of the Hong Kong people, but also the values ​​jointly maintained by the international community. The declaration calls on governments to take stronger actions to sanction relevant individuals and institutions that undermine Hong Kong’s democracy and urge the Chinese government to fulfill its commitments in the Sino-British Joint Declaration.

Yuan Gongyi said: “Freedom and human rights are universal values, and the spirit of resistance of the Hong Kong people will not be forgotten by history. We must unite and let the voice of Hong Kong be heard by the world.”

After the press conference, the participants attended a dinner with the theme of “Free Hong Kong”. During the dinner, everyone had in-depth exchanges and offered suggestions for common goals. The atmosphere was solemn and warm, showing the spirit of Hong Kong people to remain united in the face of difficulties.

This event is not only the release of a declaration, but also a symbol of unity. The support of the China Democratic Party UK Headquarters to the Hong Kong Parliament Preparatory Committee shows the cohesion of overseas democratic forces and lays the foundation for more cooperation in the future. After the event, many participants said that this press conference and dinner made them feel hope and strength, and also strengthened their determination to continue to fight for Hong Kong’s freedom and democracy.

Before the end of the event, members of the China Democratic Party UK Headquarters sang “Glory to Hong Kong” with all other participants. The passionate singing echoed in the scene, and the atmosphere was warm and touching. Many people could not hide their inner excitement, and tears flashed in their eyes. At this moment, everyone seemed to have regained the power of unity and the firm belief in freedom. The whole scene was solemn and full of hope. Free Hong Kong, everyone is responsible! May the fire of this struggle never go out!

Mr. Yuan Gongyi expressed his gratitude to the China Democracy Party UK Headquarters for their support and took a group photo with the participating party members.

Organizers of this event: Cheng Yali, Li Haobo

Participating party members of this event: Cheng Yali, Li Haobo, Cheng Xiaodan, Gu Xiaofeng, Lan Ziming, Li Jingtang, Wang Yingru, He Zhiwei, Wang Jian, Shen Chao, Dai Chao, Dai Xuemei, Zhao Yulian, Huang Hua.

Contributor of China Democracy Party UK Headquarters: Li Haobo